

**TOP SECRET**

**REF 185739**

**29 April 1964**

**MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD**

**SUBJECT: Briefing of Bureau of the Budget**

1. This morning [redacted] and I briefed Mr. Willis Shapley, Deputy Chief of the Military Division, Bureau of the Budget, on the subject of the Soviet strategic missile posture. The meeting had been arranged at Shapley's request by Mr. Chet Cooper. Shapley's principle interest was to be brought up to date on our evidence and estimates of the Soviet hard site programs. He informed us that the DOD is now programming a number of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles designed specifically to attack hard sites which is much larger than the master programmed in the fall of 1962, and he wanted to understand the relevant intelligence findings. Our discussion was on an all-source basis.

25X1

2. I opened by indicating that our knowledge of the hardening of Soviet strategic missile facilities was much better today than it was in 1962. Eighteen months ago we knew only that some degree of hardening was being incorporated into the Soviet ICBM program, and we believed for a variety of reasons that the sites then being constructed were "semi-hard", with missiles housed horizontally. We knew nothing whatever of hardening for MRBMs and IRBMs. Today, by contrast, we know that hard sites are silo sites, and that such sites are available to the SS-4, 5, 7 and 8. I indicated that our

25X1

[redacted] now appeared to be a temporary pause in the ICBM deployment program while the Soviets developed yet another ICBM, the SS-9. SS-9 hardening will evidently be quite similar to that of the earlier systems, but the pause in the program probably means that the number of operational hard silos in 1966 and perhaps 1967 will be towards the low side of the range in our most recent estimate. Beyond that time, a more advanced and smaller ICBM could appear and could result in rapid deployment of single silo launchers, bringing the total number of hard silos back up above the low side of our estimates.

3. As to MRBM and IRBM hardening, I reported that the recent evidence pointed to a somewhat larger number of silos than we had described in our most recent estimate. I pointed out that hardening for these systems had not been estimated in 1962.

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**TOP SECRET**

**TOP SECRET**

5. Mr. Shapley and Mr. Don Smith, who sat in on the meeting, had not been aware of two recent CIA memoranda on the Soviet strategic rocket forces and the SS-9. We agreed that Mr. Smith should call Chet Cooper to arrange for regular receipt by the Bureau of the Budget of CIA memoranda on Soviet military affairs.

H. SCHWARTZ, JR.  
ONE/EE Staff

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020026-3

Approved For Release 2005/05/23 : CIA-RDP79R00967A000900020026-3